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A NOTE ON SOME DIVERSE MEANINGS OF 
"THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND" 
L.F .E. Goldie* 
L THREE INTERPRETATIONS 
A. THE PROBLEM 
A number of writers on international law, including this 
author, have speculated on the customary international law status 
of General Assembly Resolutions as well as those of the United 
Nation's subsidiary organs and other international organizations in 
general. Moreover, a case law is currently evolving in decisions of 
the International Court of J ustice1 on this topic. This outpouring 
of ideas and publications has been greatly augmented by debates 
concerning the Declaration of Principles2 and the Moratorium Res-
olution, 3 as well as on Article 29 of the United Nations Charter of 
the Economic Rights and Duties of States.4 To participate in such 
a debate is not the purpose of the present article. This paper ad-
dresses itself to a largely implicit and camouflaged lexicographical 
discord on the meaning of the terms "common heritage of 
mankind" in Article 1 of the Declaration of Principles.5 While this 
task may seem to serve a more humble end than the broad deter-
mination of a law-making function, the prescriptive results of 
• Professor of Law, Director, International Legal Studies Program, Syracuse 
University College of Law. 
1. See Advisory Opinion in the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (Southwest Africa), 19711.C.J. 16 (Advisory Opinion of 
June 21) [hereinafter cited as The Namibia Case]; Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 
l.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25); Western Sahara, 1975 l.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion of Jan. 3). 
2. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and The 
Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970), reprinted in 10 l.L.M. 220 (1971) [hereinafter 
cited as the Declaration of Principles]. 
3. United Nations General Assembly Deep Seabed Mining Moratorium Resolution of 
December 15, 1969, G.A. Res. 2574D, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630 
(1969) [hereinafter cited as the Moratorium Resolution]. 
4. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See 
infra text accompanying note 18. 
5. "The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction ... are the common heritage of mankind." Declaration of Principles, supra note 
2, art. 1. 
The Declaration of Principles is frequently regarded as being in tandem with the 
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precisely determining the scope and content of the obligations 
cast, and of the rights assumed, may serve an equally essential, if 
less seductive, exercise. Indeed, the underlying premise of this 
paper is that, until the question of meaning is resolved, the act of 
prescription merely sows the dragon's teeth of a war of words. 
B. THE WAR OF WORDS ("GET ANIMAL EST TRES MECHANT, 
QUAND ON L'ATTAQUE, IL SE DEFEND''l 6 
On December 9, 1982 a majority of the states participating in 
the decade and more of negotiations which culminated at the final 
ceremonies of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (the Treaty).7 The United States refrained. Some states, in-
cluding a number of those friendly to the United States (for ex-
ample Australia, Brazil, Mexico and Nigeria) demanded that the 
United States not proceed to mine the deep ocean floor for 
manganese nodules. 8 These comments, although perhaps 
disconcerting to the well-intentioned, do no more than mildly echo 
the excoriating remarks hurled at the 1980 Session of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) 
held in Geneva. At the Plenary Debate on "The USA Unilateral 
Seabed Mining Legislation," the United States was energetically 
denounced9 for enacting the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources 
Moratorium Resolution, supra note 3. The operative part of the Moratorium Resolution 
states that the General Assembly of the United Nations: 
Declares that, pending the establishment of the aforementioned international 
regime: 
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all activities 
of exploitation of the resources of the area of the seabed and ocean floor, and the 
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; 
(b) no claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be recognized. 
6. P.K. THEODORE, LA MENAGERIE (1868). (This animal is very mean, when attacked, 
it defends itself.) 
7. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982). 
8. For example, Chief R.O.A. Akinjide Lan, A.G. of Nigeria and Chairman of the 
Nigerian Delegation to the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference at Montego Bay, 
Jamaica, December 8, 1982, stated: 
No national legislation, no mini-treaty or no agreement entered into by the 
"reciprocating nations" under any nation's municipal mining laws would provide a 
good title as long as a global Convention exists under the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea adopted in accordance with its rules and procedures. 
Personal record of L.F.E. Goldie. 
9. See Statement in Plenary Debate on USA Unilateral Seabed Mining Legislation, 
Monday, July 28, 1980, at 1-2 (verbatim record taken from official LOS Conference tape). 
For example, Ambassador J. Alan Beesley, Q.C., denounced the U.S. legislation, at the 
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Act, 10 which President Carter signed into law on June 28, 1980. 
Last December the United States was execrated for having firmly 
acted on its belated discovery that the seabed mining regime, 
which UNCLOS III has fabricated, seeks to establish an environ-
ment inimical to American resource interests, and for refusing to 
go further down the path of agreeing to accept a designated 
sacrificial role. Hence, this country is now censured for being, so 
its accusers allege, guilty of bad faith. The critics of the United 
States also charge this country with illegal conduct in breaking off 
negotiations .for a treaty which had not been finally drafted. 
The United States neither signed a treaty nor granted any ir-
revocable authority to another state or representative to sign a 
treaty binding her to accept, here and now, the UN CLOS III 
regime. What then, is the basis of this charge of bad faith and il-
legal conduct? It is derived from a number of spurious allegations, 
namely: (1) that participation in the Conference has created 
equities enuring in other states because of the belief that the 
United States would become a party to the treaty, whether or not 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), Ninth Resumed Ses-
sion, where he said, inter alia: 
I wish to make quite clear what our position is, Mr. President. We regret this 
legislation. We deplore it. We consider it unnecessary, undesirable, unjustifiable 
and untimely. We consider it contrary to the concept of the common heritage of 
mankind, a concept quite possibly the greatest of any principle or ideal which will 
emerge from this Conference. We consider that it violates the fundamental princi-
ple, of which my Delegation had a large part in the establishment, to which the 
Conference is dedicated, namely the principle of consensus. We do no accept the 
validity of the arguments advanced in support of such legislation. We do not 
understand the rationale for the legislation, coming as it does so close to the end of 
this Conference, and we say this with the greatest of understanding for the coun-
try which has passed this legislation. We share the deep concern expressed by 
speakers representing the vast majority of humanity, certainly the vast majority 
of delegations represented at this Conference .... What we find particularly objec-
tionable is that the Conference appears to be being told what to do on certain ques-
tions such as protection of investments. Surely there is a better approach and it's 
one that USA delegation above all has always followed- the attempt to negotiate 
in good faith to achieve equitable compromises. 
Well, we are all here to negotiate in good faith and not on the basis of a dic-
tate of a pre-judgment of the results specifically designed to override the outcome 
of our deliberations if they don't happen to agree with the preconditions laid down. 
For a selection of some additional samples of this kind of denunciation voiced at that 
Plenary Debate, see Goldie, A Selection of Books Reflecting Perspectives in the Seabed 
Mining Debate: Part /, 15 INT'L LAW. 293, 298-300 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Goldie, A 
Selection of Views: Part I]. 
10. Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473)(Supp. V 
1981). 
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her interests were adequately reflected in the final document; (2) 
that the great majority of states which have signed the treaty 
have pre-empted the exploitation of the minerals of the deep ocean 
floor so as to preclude a state not a member of the regime created 
under the Treaty from engaging in activities inconsistent with 
that regime's policies and prescriptions; and (3) an argument that 
has two aspects, one strong, the other weak, to the effect that the 
United States' vote in favor of the Resolution, approved by the 
United Nations General Assembly on December 17, 1970, entitled 
the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Subsoil 
Thereof Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 11 has a legally 
preclusive effect that prevents the United States from permitting 
deep seabed mining under its policies and laws. The key to both 
arguments is in that Declaration's Article 1 which asserts: 
The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the 
area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common 
heritage of mankind.12 
The strong argument simply asserts that the manifesto of Ar-
ticle l, "the common heritage of mankind," has become instant 
customary international law. It operates effectively to preclude all 
seabed mining activities outside the UNCLOS III regime "to be 
established." It also is said to invalidate all other possible treaty 
regimes on the subject. The weak argument, on the other hand, 
merely asserts that the United States' vote in favor of the 
Declaration of Principles carried the necessary implication, 
despite declarations to the contrary, that this country also ac-
cepted the then emerging Group of 77's13 interpretation of the 
"common heritage" principle. 
1. "Instant Customary International Law''14 
The strong argument for the preclusive effect of the 
manifesto contained in the common heritage formula contends 
11. Declaration of Principles, supra note 2. 
12. Id. art. 1. 
13. This is the name standardly given to the caucus of developing countries operating 
on what they perceive to be their common interest in voting in the various institutions of 
the United Nations family. The designation itself would now appear to be an anachronism, 
since the number of caucus members has swollen from the original 77 to over .121 (at this 
reviewer's last count). The number is still growing. 
14. For the coinage of this evocative and descriptive phrase see Cheng, United Na-
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that international law has been changed by the General 
Assembly's lopsided votes15 in favor of the Moratorium and 
Declaration of Principles Resolutions, and through its continuing 
evolution towards the New International Economic Order16-the 
stated objective of which is to facilitate the transference of wealth 
and power to the developing world.11 A result of this change, so 
the contention runs, has been to invalidate the underlying prop-
erty and contract institutions, doctrines, rules and concepts upon 
which private and state-owned deep seabed mining enterprises 
ground the legality, probable effectiveness and validity of their 
predictions and transactions. 
In this context, Article 29 of the United Nations Charter of 
the Economic Rights and Duties of States is worth mentioning. It 
summarizes the attitude of the Group of 77 towards both the hard 
mineral resources of the deep ocean floor, and deep seabed mining 
by the American mining industry and its partners, in the following 
terms: 
The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the 
area, are the common heritage of mankind. On the basis of the 
principles adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 27 49 
tions Resolution on Outer Space: "Instant International Customary Law"?, 5 INDIAN J. 
INT'L L. 23-(1965). For the relevance of voting support for the United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions to the formation of international law, see Goldie, The North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf Case-A Ray of Hope for the International Court?, 16 N.Y.L. FORUM 325, 
342-49 (1970), and the authors cited therein as participants in the debate. 
15. The vote on the Moratorium Resolution was 62 in favor, 28 against, 28 abstaining, 
and 8 absent. None of the major maritime states, it should be noted, voted in favor of the 
Moratorium Resolution. By contrast, the vote on the Declaration of Principles was 108 in 
favor, none against, 14 abstaining, none absent. 
16. See, e.g., United Nations Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See also Inter-
national Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, G.A. 
Res. 2626, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); Declaration on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 26 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); Programme of Action on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 5, U.N. 
Doc. A/9559 (1974); Development and International Economic Cooperation, G.A. Res. 3362, 
27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/10301 (1975); Preparation for an International 
Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, G.A. Res. 33/193, 
33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978). See also G.A. Res. 32/174, 32 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 107, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977). 
17. See, e.g., R. MEAGHER, ANINTERNATIONALREDISTRIBUTIONOFWEALTHANDPOWER: 
A STUDY OF THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, passim (1979), and the 
documents therein cited and presented. 
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(XXV) of 17 December 1970, all States shall ensure that the ex-
ploration of the area and exploitation of its resources are carried 
out exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the benefits deriv-
ed therefrom are shared equitably by all States, taking into ac-
count the particular interests and needs of developing countries; 
an international regime applying to the area and its resources 
and including appropriate international machinery to give effect 
to its provisions shall be established by an international treaty 
of a universal character, generally agreed upon.18 
The two resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly 
(namely the Moratorium and Declaration of Principles Resolu-
tions)19 have been declared to create customary international law 
here and now. Thus, the "Group of Legal Experts on the Question 
of Unilateral Legislation"20 have asserted, in their Manifesto, that: 
The principles set out in resolution 27 49 (XXV) [Declaration 
of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and 
the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction] 
are legally binding principles which were proclaimed in this 
Declaration and upheld by the affirmative vote of 108 States. It 
should be added that a number of the few States (14) which ab-
stained on that occasion, although without formulating any ob-
jection, subsequently expressed, either explicitly or implicitly, 
their support for those principles, as did other States members 
of the international community, thus recognizing by their at-
titude the force of international custom as expressed in Resolu-
tion 2749. 
This custom has given rise to the new general principles of 
18. Charter of the Economic Rights, supra note 16, art. 29. 
19. See supra note 5. 
20. The Group of Legal Experts consisted of Dr. Roberto Herrera Caceres 
(Honduras), Ambassador to Belgium, the Netherlands and the EEC, as Chairman, and the 
following members: Professor Madjid Bencheickh (Algeria), Professor of Law; Professor 
Mohamed Bennouna (Morocco), Dean of the Faculty of Law, Rabat; Dr. Jorge Castanneda 
(Mexico), Ambassador, member of the International Law Commission; Dr. S.P. Jagota (In-
dia), Ambassador, Under-Secretary and Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
member of the International Law Commission; Dr. Julio Cesar Lupinacci (Uruguay), Under-
Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Biram Ndiaye (Senegal), Professor of Law, 
University of Dakar; Dr. Frank X. Njenga (Kenya), Under-Secretary, member of the Inter-
national Law Commission; Mr. C. Pinto (Sri Lanka), Ambassador to the Federal Republic of 
Germany, member of the International Law Commission; Mr. K. Rattray (Jamaica), Am-
bassador, Solicitor General, Attorney-General's Chambers; Dr. S. Sucharitkul (Thailand), 
Director General, Treaty and Legal Departments, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of 
the Internatinal Law Commission; Dr. Yasseen (United Arab Emirates), Counsellor, Perma-
nent Mission at Geneva. 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1983], Art. 7
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/7
1983] The Common Heritage of Mankind 
public international law which are the basis or legal foundation 
of any substantive norms regulating the exploration of the area 
of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof and the 
exploitation of their resources.21 
75 
In support of the opposite thesis that the Declaration of Prin-
ciples does not constitute international law, one should point out 
that the Declaration must be read both in light of the explanations 
of votes given to the First Committee of the General Assembly, 
and Judge Sir Robert Jennings' assertion that "seen in the light of 
these explanations the Declaration assumes a very different as-
pect from that reflected in the mere text of it."22 Indeed, far from 
having the legislative effect which, for example, the Group of 
Legal Experts claim for it in their Manifesto,23 the Declaration of 
Principles has received neither a universal opinio iuris nor the 
general support in state practice by the states most significantly 
interested or directly affected. It must also be emphasized that 
both of these two necessary conditions must be met before the 
regime contemplated in the Declaration of Principles can lawfully 
be said to have replaced the positive norms and established rights 
and privileges now guaranteed by the freedom of the seas. On this 
issue of the importance of practice, in addition to declarations 
evidencing opinio iuris sive necessitatis, the International Court 
of Justice spoke unequivocally in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases,2' when it stated that: 
21. Letter dated April 23, 1979 from the Group of Legal Experts on the Question of 
Unilateral Legislation to the Chairman of the Group of 77 (annexed to the letter dated April 
24, 1979 from the Chairman of the Group of 77 to the Chairman of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea). Geneva, Eighth Session, Mar. 19 to Apr. 27, 1979 at 6, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/77 (1979), 9 UNCLOS III O.R. 8th Sess., Geneva, Mar. 19 to Apr. 27, 
1979 at 80, U.N. Sales No. E.80V.6 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Manifesto]. See also AsIAN-
AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, STUDY ON THE REVISED SINGLE NEGOTIATING 
TEXTS 10-11 (1976), where the following statement received agreement: 
The only way which this concept [i.e., the status of the hard mineral resources of 
the deep ocean floor beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any state as "the com-
mon heritage of mankind"] can be translated into practice would be to treat the 
resources of the area as being under the joint undivided ownership of all nations .... 
If this is so, then the activities in the area have necessarily to be under [the] effec-
tive control of the international authority acting on behalf of the entire interna-
tional community and activities by individual States or their nationals cannot be 
permitted except when doing so on behalf of the authority. 
22. Jennings, The United States Draft Treaty on the International Seabed Area: 
Basic Principles, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 433, 435-36, 439 (1970). 
23. See supra note 21. 
24. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 19691.C.J. 3 (Judg-
ment of Feb. 20). 
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Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled prac-
tice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, 
as to evidence a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory 
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.25 
It should be noted, furthermore, that the Court rejected an 
argument that a principle of equidistance (Article 6 of the Con-
tinental Shelf Convention),26 had become crystallized into a 
customary rule of international law through a combination of 
definitional refinement in the successive drafts of the Inter-
national Law Commission, and the adoption of the Continental 
Shelf Convention by the 1958 United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea.27 The Court based this rejection on grounds of a 
lack of uniformity of state practice in this regard in the past and 
the probability of an equal lack of uniformity in the future because 
of the permissibility of making reservations with respect to Arti-
cle 6 (and the other articles apart from Articles 1-3). 28 
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, however, now pro-
vide only a rather early milestone on the road to an increasing 
acknowledgment of the role of the General Assembly, conferences 
called by it, and its subsidiary organs, in the formation of inter-
national law. (Space does not permit an analysis of the classifica-
tion of that law-i.e., as custom, general principles of international 
law, etc.)29 Apart from areas where the General Assembly is 
recognized as having a special competence, for example, in the 
regulation of its subsidiary organs, the Secretariat, or the ter-
ritory of Namibia,30 its resolutions may be consulted as indicating 
trends in opinion and, further, as betokening legal developments. 
For example, in the Western Sahara case,31 the International 
Court of Justice concluded that the right of self-determination for 
non-self-governing territories had become a norm of international 
law. In reaching this conclusion it first looked to Article l, 
paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter which based the 
25. Id. at 44. See also statements to a similar effect in The Asylum Case (Colum. v. 
Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Judgment of Nov. 20); The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 28 (Judgment of Sept. 7). 
26. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, 474, 
T.l.A.S. No. 5578, at 4, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312, 316 (effective June 10, 1964). 
27. Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 38. 
28. Id. at 38-39. 
29. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38. 
30. See The Namibia Case, supra note 1. 
31. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion of Jan. 3). 
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United Nations' purpose of developing friendly relations among 
nations "on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples .... "32 The Court then looked to the Gen-
eral Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples,33 and subsequent resolutions 
and declarations on the topic. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case,34 
the Court looked to conferences called by the General Assembly to 
underpin, in part, the concept of the "preferential rights of the 
coastal State in a special situation .... "35 
In the Western Sahara case, the Court could also support its 
thesis by reference to supporting state practice.36 Indeed, there 
would appear to have been a veritable race of imperial divestiture 
between those who spoke and voted in the General Assembly and 
those who had ruled the colonial territories and were rapidly 
transferring the powers of government to their former subjects. 
The almost universal divestiture of colonial power was also an im-
portant, if barely mentioned, element underpinning the Court's 
perspective in the Western Sahara case.37 That decision reflected 
the decisive state practice so essential for establishing the ex-
istence of a rule of customary international law. In addition, we 
should not lose sight of the fact that the resolutions, like the 
divestitures, were merely spelling out the modalities and carrying 
into fruition the obligations which states had assumed under the 
United Nations Charter. 
The quality of consent, measured not only in terms of assent-
ing votes, but also by practical performance and participation, re-
mains an essential element. The stage has not been reached where 
parliamentary diplomacy can be used as a tool in the hands of 
large majorities of states in the General Assembly, and at con-
32. See also The Namibia Case, supra note 1, at 31. 
33. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961). 
34. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 19741.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25). For an ear-
ly, discriminating and seminal view of the status, in international law, of resolutions of the 
General Assembly, see the separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in Southwest 
Africa-Voting Procedure, 1955 l.C.J. 67, 115 (Advisory Opinion of June 7). 
35. Id. at 26. 
36. Note, for example, the Court's comment: "State practice on the subject of 
fisheries reveals an increasing and widespread acceptance of the concept of preferential 
rights for coastal States, particularly in favor of countries or territories in a situation of 
special dependence on coastal fisheries." Id. In reviewing "state practice" the Court looked, 
not only to resolutions and declarations at conferences, but also to agreements and ar-
rangements in the North-East Atlantic and North-East Arctic. Id. 
37. Western Sahara, 1975 l.C.J. at 29-35. 
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ferences, to impose repugnant obligations on dissenting 
minorities. This is especially true when such impositions effective-
ly exclude the minorities' inputs into the prescriptive arena.38 Nor 
may those majorities use their numbers to render minority states' 
interests meaningless. 
In addition to these considerations, this writer has offered 
elsewhere an argument more specifically relevant to the issue of 
the status of the Declaration of Principles in terms of its failure to 
have crystallized into customary international law. It is as follows: 
Have these resolutions crystallized into law? And would such a 
law make illegal any form of deep seabed mining beyond national 
jurisdiction outside the regime to be devised at UNCLOS III? 
At the San Francisco Conference of 1945 which drafted the 
Charter of the United Nations,39 a proposal was made which 
would have given the General Assembly power to declare inter-
national law. This was firmly rejected. But what would then be 
the status of such resolutions as those containing the declara-
tions of the "common heritage"? There are two levels of 
effectiveness to be considered. First, resolutions of this kind, of 
themselves, cannot be self-executing. They are not legislation 
with immediately obligating effects. Some resolutions, however, 
such as that on decolonization, through both the widespread sup-
port they received and the speedy implementation of their goals 
in the practice of states, especially in practice of the former col-
onizing states, have become recognized as customary inter-
national law. On the other hand, when implementation by univer-
sal or near universal state practice is lacking, the relevant 
resolutions have merely the quality of the "policy directives" of 
say, the Irish and Indian Constitutions. 
But such "policy directives" are not entirely ineffective. 
They do at least impose duties of respect and recognition by vir-
tue of their moral force. A state acting against their terms 
should thoroughly consider its compelling reasons for so acting, 
especially if, while some states choose to ignore that directive, 
others are building up a state practice in its support. So far, 
there has been little, if any, state practice implementing the 
"common heritage" principle. 
38. For a discussion of the important notion of the prescriptive arena in the formation 
of international obligations, see McDougal, Laswell, and Reisman, The World Constitutive 
Process of Authoritative Division, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73 
(C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1969). 
39. The Charter entered into force on Oct. 24, 1945. 
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There is a further consideration. Where states act, even if in 
order to implement a General Assembly Resolution, in a manner 
which invades the existing rights of other states and involves 
breaches of international law, further grave issues are raised. 
Today, for example, the seizure of a foreign flag ship, without 
lawful justification (that is, without the justification of a treaty, 
customary international law, right or privilege so to act), is a 
breach of the customary international law of the sea. It also in-
volves a breach of the United Nations Charter (including Article 
2, paragraph 4).'0 While, traditionally, customary international 
law could once have been created through acts which were 
originally unlawful if acquiesced in for a sufficiently long period, 
and on a sufficiently wide basis, it is doubtful whether the world 
community would today accept a legal principle based on acts in 
defiance of the United Nations Charter. It is to be doubted, 
furthermore, if the essential ingredient of acquiescence would be 
forthcoming. It should be noted, therefore, that a state practice 
seeking to implement the "common heritage" principle should 
not itself be steeped in initial illegality. This may well leave the 
establishment of that principle to the consent of the states con-
cerned in a univer-sal or nearly universal convention rather than 
through the high-handed unilateral and illegal acts of states 
seeking, through confrontation tactics, to establish what they 
claim (and mistakenly claim, it is insisted) to be a state practice 
leading to the creation of a proposed rule of customary inter-
national law. 
It seems to me, therefore, that here and now we are in a 
situation of stasis. On the one hand, there is an imminent 
possibility of change; on the other, there is no body of law pro-
hibiting deep seabed mining. Furthermore, many of the acts 
which might be taken to prevent such mining could themselves 
constitute serious breaches of international law-for example, 
infringement of the rights of the flag nation of a mining ship, 
breaches of the "rules of the road," and illegal searches and 
seizures.'1 
79 
40. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 
para. 4. 
It seems unusual to this writer that the "Group of Legal Experts" would advocate the 
argument suggested in the text accompanying note 27 supra, an argument premised upon 
and supporting, or at least sympathizing with, conduct constituting such a palpable breach 
of the U.N. Charter. 
41. Goldie, Customary International Law and Deep Seabed Mining, 6 SYR. J. INT'L L. 
& COM. 173, 180-82 (1979). 
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2. Interpretation: a Matter of "Good Faith" and Alleged 
''Reliance" through ''Participation" 
The proponents of the argument for the legislative effect of a 
General Assembly Resolution assert that the United States, by ac-
cepting the principle of the common heritage of mankind, par-
ticipating in the negotiations of the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, and especially, in the drafting of 
Articles 136 and 137 of the Treaty,42 has also accepted the Group 
of 77's interpretation of the phrase common heritage, rather than 
the interpretation expounded by American spokesmen and 
representatives at the Conference. The accusers argue that the 
imputed acceptance entitles them to charge any subsequent 
United States action in support or regulation of its domestic deep 
seabed mining industry as a breach of that international legisla-
tion. Their thesis is based on the premise that the only possible 
interpretation of the common heritage of mankind is that it 
operates preclusively on mining activities not licensed under the 
regime as instant customary international law, immediately bind-
ing on all the states of the world. Such an interpretation repeals 
the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas, at least insofar as it 
applies to the deep seabed and its resources, and dedicates the ex-
clusive control of that seabed area to a centralized enclosure.43 
3. Other Perspectives 
On the other hand, many other interpretations are possible, 
not all of which have the preclusive effect of the one put forward 
by the representatives of the Group of 77. Indeed, one other inter-
pretation considers an inclusive open access customary regime to 
be as legitimate as the preclusive interpretation under the com-
mon heritage slogan. The open access interpretation, which has 
been reiterated by the United States representatives at every op-
portunity, asserts that, insofar as it reflects customary inter-
national law, common heritage means no more than the common-
ness of a common field wherein all may pasture their stock, or a 
42. Article 136 states: "The Area [the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction] and its resources are the common heritage of 
mankind." U.N. Doc. A!CONF. 62/122 (1980). For the text of Article 137, see infra note 47. 
43. For a discussion of enclosures in the context of the world's commons see supra 
notes 32-36 and accompanying text. See also Goldie, A Modest Proposal for Preventing In-
ternational Law from being a Burthen to the International Community and to Law 
Teachers, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 331, 336-37 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Goldie, Modest Proposal]. 
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common well wherefrom all may draw their water, or a common 
stream in which all may fish. Its commonness means that no state 
may assert exclusive, territorial sovereignty over any part of it.44 
This interpretation may be contrasted with the first position, that 
of the Group of 77. Spokesmen of that group argue that when the 
U .N. General Assembly agreed to the common heritage principle 
of Article 1 of the Declaration of Principles, a preclusive regime 
was thereby immediately established regarding deep seabed min-
ing, and that, notwithstanding the prior legal position, the 
freedom of the high seas no longer applied to mining activities 
under the high seas and beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
A third definition, that advocated by Ambassador Arvid 
Pardo, argues that the Declaration of Principles has prescribed an 
ideal of the centralized or international enclosure45 of the high 
seas. This should apply to all of the resources of the oceans beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction, not only to deep seabed mining. 
Pardo deplores the national enclosures of the oceans' commons by 
coastal states which the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea permits.'6 
C. THE COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS 
1. The Group of 77's Assertion of a Preclusive Effect 
The Group of 77's position was succinctly stated by Am-
bassador Pinto to the ~aw of the Sea Workshop on December 
11-14, 1978 at the University of Hawaii. He argued that the 
mineral resources of the deep seabed are currently res publicae. 
This he defined as follows: 
This [the common heritage of mankind] means that those 
minerals cannot be freely mined. They are not there, so to speak, 
for the taking. The common heritage of mankind is the common 
property of mankind. The commonness of the "common heritage" 
is a commonness of ownership and benefit. The minerals are 
owned in common by your country and mine, and by all the rest 
as well. In their original locations these resources belong in un-
divided and indivisible share to your country and to mine, and to 
44. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
45. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; see also Goldie, Modest Proposal, 
supra note 43, at 336-37. 
46. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 21 l.L.M. 1261. 
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all the rest-to all mankind, in fact, whether organized as States 
or not. If you touch the nodules at the bottom of the sea, you 
touch my property. If you take them away, you take away my 
property.'7 
He further explained this definition in terms of the inter-
pretation, advocated by the Group of 77, of the common heritage 
principle, as effectively denying any right of access on the part of 
any person or state prior to the establishment of a world-wide 
treaty regime. He contended that: 
It follows, therefore, that before you can mine the nodules and 
win them from the bottom of the sea, mankind must have con-
sented to the method you have chosen. It is because all of us 
agreed eight years ago that this was the absolute, fundamental 
rule of the game, that this was in fact, the law, that we have 
engaged in for eight years in trying to decide what method or 
system of resource-taking shall have mankind's approval.'8 
An additional argument has been propounded that Paragraph 
1 of the General Assembly's Declaration of Principles has effec-
tively dedicated the hard minerals of the deep seabeds to the 
world community's sole use as a whole and as having effectively 
denied private (or state enterprise) access, except by permission 
of the representatives of "all the peoples of the world."49 In addi-
47. Pinto, Statement, in ALTERNATIVES IN DEEPSEA MINING 13 (S. Allen & J. Craven 
eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Pinto, Statement]. Article 137 of the Draft Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L.78 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention] 
formulates, as a Treaty-based agreement, not as a customary norm, the specifics of this 
view in the following terms: 
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part 
of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridicial person ap-
propriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign 
rights, nor such appropriation shall be recognized. 
2. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on 
whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to aliena-
tion. The minerals recovered from the Area, however, may only be alienated in ac-
cordance with this Part and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authori-
ty. 
3. No state or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights 
with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance with 
this Part. Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition or exercise of such rights shall be 
recognized. 
48. Pinto, Statement, supra note 47, at 13-14. 
49. See Draft Convention, supra note 47, Art. 137. See also Statement of Mr. Pohl (El 
Salvador), 25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1781st mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1975, at 2 (1970); see 
statement of Mr. Zegers (Chile), U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1975, at 2 (1970), where Mr. Zegers 
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tion to representatives of the Group of 77 and of the Eastern Euro-
pean Bloc countries in the General Assembly, other leaders of 
opinion in the Second and Third Worlds have echoed this view; for 
example, the "Group of Legal Experts on the Question of 
Unilateral Legislation"50 have contended that: 
The principles of law laid down in resolution 2749 (XXV) form 
the basis of any international regime applicable to the Area and 
its resources .... 
Consequently, any unilateral act or mini-treaty is unlawful 
in that it violates these principles, for the legal regime, whether 
provisional or definitive, can only be established with the con-
sent of the international community as the sole representative of 
mankind and in conformity with the system determined by the 
international community. 
It should be stressed that no investor would have any legal 
guarantee for his investments in such activities, for he would 
likewise be subject to individual or collective action by the other 
States in defense of the common heritage of mankind, and no 
purported diplomatic protection would carry any legal weight 
whatsoever.51 
This interpretation that the common heritage of mankind has 
a preclusive effect on deep seabed mining, and the Group of 77's 
attack on the U.S. thesis regarding the right of her citizens to 
mine for manganese nodules, has been examined by Ambassador 
Pinto in terms of Roman Law doctrines and analogies. He declared 
that: 
The legal status of the resources of deep seabed itself forbids 
mining under unilaterally developed individual or group regimes 
however well-intentioned, however efficient, however designed 
to fit in and coalesce with some future internationally agreed 
said, inter alia: "Legally, we might contend that it is an indivisible property with fruits that 
can be divided. But politically and economically speaking, it means that all states, coastal or 
landlocked, will participate in the administration of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction 
and in the benefits derived from that region." See also statements of the representatives of 
Guyana, Peru, Venezuela, Malaysia, Libya, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, and Brazil et al., U.N. Doc. 
A/C.1/PV.1788, at 2, 10, 13 (1970); U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1786, at 2 (1970); U.N. Doc. 
A/C.1/PV.1780, at 2-3 (1970); U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1784, at 7 (1970); and U.N. Doc. 
A/C.1/PV.1777, at 11 (1970). 
50. See supra note 20. 
51. See supra note 21. 
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regime .... [T]he "common heritage" of these resources ... is 
more akin to property held in trust - held in trust for "mankind 
as a whole," for the public. It is therefore closest to "res 
publicae," the property of the people, to be administered by the 
people and for the people.52 
Much juridical analysis has gone into Ambassador Pinto's 
persuasive presentation, and into that of his colleagues, regarding 
their interpretation of the common heritage principle. By contrast, 
no commensurate explanation has convincingly vindicated their 
premises by justifying the legal validity of that interpretation, or 
of the claims deriving therefrom. The question of how that one 
view of the principle of the common heritage has come to supplant 
the freedom of the high seas and has transformed what was once 
the lawful exercise of an assured privilege into an unlawful act, re-
mains unanswered. 
2. Freedom of the High Seas and Open Access to Common Goods 
Theodore Kronmiller53 has supported the view advocated by 
the United States and other developed Western democracies as an 
application of the traditional doctrine of the freedom of the high 
seas. This is expressed in terms of a theory of common access to 
common goods. He has summarized this position in the following 
conclusory statement: 
[U]nder international law, it is permissible for a State or private 
enterprise unilaterally to appropriate the resources of the sea-
bed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Deep 
seabed mining is clearly within the principle of the freedom of 
the seas and is consistent with rules of customary international 
law and relevant conventional law. All States are under a duty to 
respect the lawful exercise of the freedom to explore and exploit 
the resources of the deep seabed and subsoil. 
To this it should be added that, in international law, there is 
no reason why this activity may not be supported by domestic 
legislation which does not purport to claim sovereignty or 
sovereign rights over, or ownership of, areas of the deep seabed 
and subsoil or otherwise to exclude nationals of nonconsenting 
States.54 
52. Pinto, Statement, supra note 47, at 14-15. 
53. T. KRONMILLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING (1980). 
54. Id. at 521. 
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After a thorough review of both the Declaration of Principles 
and the Moratorium Resolution, with reference to the emergence 
of the thesis that seabed hard minerals beyond the territorial 
jurisdiction of any state are the common heritage of mankind, he 
argues that, while acceptance of the doctrine is widespread, if not 
universal, it remains without specific content or applicability. In-
deed, he argues that all states should have access to the explora-
tion and exploitation of the minerals of the ocean floor,55 and that 
this concept will remain valid under customary law until it is 
replaced by a universally accepted treaty. Exceptions to the cur-
rent customary regime may come into being, however, through 
more particular treaties among the parties, the transnational 
operations of appropriately drafted domestic legislation creating 
reciprocal regimes, and proposals to the participating states by 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
The supporters of open access and freedom of the high seas 
argue that, short of universal acceptance, the regime prescribed in 
the U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Sea necessarily remains a 
special treaty regime operating only among the parties to it.56 This 
last point too frequently appears to have been forgotten, perhaps 
largely due to the enthusiastic rhetoric of those who wish to 
establish a new universal regime which would oust the present 
customary law system. Their especial target for demolition ap-
pears to be the freedom of the high seas, and the rights, liberties 
and privileges, including free and equal access to the oceans' 
resources, which flow therefrom. 
The premise of the argument that the Declaration of Prin-
ciples does not constitute an instant and preclusive rule of interna-
tional law57 is the surely unobjectionable proposition that, on the 
basis of the sovereign equality and independence of states, a state 
should not be held to be bound by an international instrument to 
which it is not a consenting party. If such an instrument reflects 
55. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, 54TH CONFERENCE, THE HAGUE 
824 (1970). Indeed, Kronmiller points out that this is an example of actions taken "not only 
within the U .N ., but also outside it, to affirm and to give content to the notion of the com-
mon heritage of mankind." He argues that this exemplifies, and testifies, to the historical 
fact that the "common heritage existed independently of the General Principles 
Resolution." KRONMILLER, supra note 53, at 238-39. 
56. On this issue, which has become only too facilely blurred in debate, see the impor-
tant discussion by Jennings, supra note 22 at 435-36. 
57. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
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agreement between a number of states, it still necessarily remains 
res inter alios acta amongst all others. A vitally interested non-
signatory state may not be deprived of its existing fundamental 
rights and freedoms without its consent and without due attention 
being paid to its right to determine its own destiny. 
In the meantime, exceptions to the current customary order 
may attain legal status between the parties by more particular 
treaty regimes, or by the transnational operation of appropriately 
drafted reciprocating domestic legal systems, or by adherence to 
the regime to be established under the Treaty which was signed 
at Montego Bay in December 1982. That treaty culminated the 
long, arduous work of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, but it still awaits a sufficient number of 
adherences before it can enter into force among a minimum 
number of parties to it. 
One final point: The United States' position, reflected in the 
Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act of 1980,58 advocates 
open access and an escrow fund for all. This could arguably be said 
to be tinged with Professor John Rawls' "second principle of 
justice" because while it envisages an inequality of access to ex-
ploitable resources, it seeks to give the greatest tangible benefits 
to the most disadvantaged.59 
3. Ambassador Arvid Pardo- "Centralized Enclosure" 
A third interpretation of the common heritage principle is 
that of Ambassador Arvid Pardo, who is regarded as the pro-
genitor60 of this phrase in the law of the sea context. In his critical 
review of the law of the sea negotiations, he wrote: 
The objective of the Maltese proposal was to replace the 
principle of freedom of the seas by the principle of common 
heritage of mankind in order to preserve the greater part of 
ocean space as a commons accessible to the international com-
munity. The commons of the high seas, however, would be no 
longer open to the whims of the users and exploiters; it would be 
internationally administered. International administration of the 
commons and management of its resources for the common good 
58. See supra note 10. 
59. For a critical discussion of the application of Professor John Rawls' principles and 
prescriptions of justice to the international arena, see S. HOFFMAN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS 
154-58 (1981). 
60. See, Pardo, Whose is the Bed of the Sea?, 62 PROC. AM. Soc·y INT'L L. 216 (1968). 
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distinguished the principle of common heritage from the tradi-
tional principle of the high seas as res communis.61 
He added the explanation that: 
[I]n the Maltese view the common heritage concept has five 
basic implications. First, the common heritage of mankind could 
not be appropriated; it was open to use by the international com-
munity but was not owned by the international community. Se-
cond, it required a system of management in which all users have 
a right to share. Third, it implied an active sharing of benefits, 
not only financial but also benefits derived from shared manage-
ment and transfer of technology, thus radically transforming the 
conventional relationships between states and traditional con-
cepts of development aid. Fourth, the concept of common 
heritage implied reservation for peaceful purposes, insofar as 
politically achievable, and, fifth, it implied reservation for fur-
ther generations, and thus had environmental implications. 
For Malta the principle of common heritage was conceptual-
ly joined with the idea of functional sovereignty, as distinguish-
ed from the traditional concept of territorial sovereignty.62 
87 
While Pardo sees the common heritage as a guiding principle for 
the negotiation of a new regime to replace the current customary 
rule of the freedom of the high seas, Ambassador Pinto argues 
that it has already been established as a general international law 
norm created by the fiat of the United Nations General Assembly63 
to govern deep seabed mining operations. 
Ambassador Pardo interprets the common heritage as a pro-
posal to be negotiated with the object of setting up a treaty 
regime supplanting the customary rule of the freedom of the high 
seas, limited to deep seabed mining but including all uses which 
rely on the traditional customary international law doctrine. He 
advocates a completely new blueprint for the law governing man-
kind's use of the resources of the high seas beyond the limits of 
the resource jurisdiction of any state. He espouses the complete 
61. Pardo, Law of the Sea Conference- What Went Wrong, in MANAGING OCEAN 
RESOURCES: A PRIMER 137, 139 (Friedheim ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Friedheim]. 
62. Id. at 141. 
63. For a critical comment on the use of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea (UN CLOS III) as a vechicle for world socialism, especially in relation to deep 
seabed mining, see Goldie, A Selection of Books Reflecting Perspectives in the Seabed Min-
ing Debate: Part II, 15 INT'LLAW. 445, 451-69, & 469-97 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Goldie, A 
Selection of Views: Part II]. Part I of the selection was published in 15 INT'L LAW. 293 
(1981), see supra note 9. 
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replacement of the regime of the freedom of the high seas by a 
regime of equitable management. He is also concerned that the 
concentration of his ideal of the common heritage upon deep sea-
bed mining alone signals the probable loss of an historic opportun-
ity for mankind. 
D. AN ANIMADVERSION ON "ENCLOSURES" 
Emphasis can be given to the distinction between common ac-
cess to a common resource and exclusive management, in the 
name of the public benefit, by reiterating this writer's comments 
of a decade and more ago: 
On all hands people uncritically accept as true the lightsome 
remark that freedom of the high seas serves the interests of the 
Great States and therefore the restriction of that freedom must 
inevitably provide a vital lifeline for the lesser and poorer na-
tions. True it is all that states, great and small, individually seek 
to increase, to the maximum degree, their own exclusive uses of 
the common seas' resources. In such enterprises the richer and 
more assertive might well be seen as benefiting more from their 
common heritage than the poorer or more modest. In such a free-
for-all many states cause their jurisdictions to creep, and leap, 
sea ward in an enclosure movement. But I have yet to find the 
enclosure of a manor's commons which profited its yeomanry. 
For I am told by a wor[l]dly-wise [sic] London friend that all 
private Acts of Enclosure are introduced into the Parliament by 
Members who are drawn from the village squirearchy. These 
landed gentlemen carry through their bills either on their own 
behalf or to assist friends placed in a similar standing in the 
agricultural interests of their counties. Is the situation among 
nations so different? Like great magnates, great states could 
live well upon abundant resources which a seaward enclosure 
movement would add to their present wealth. Small states, by 
contrast would, with only rare and perhaps bizarre exceptions, 
be entitled to more meagre patches of the commons. Lastly, 
landlocked states would suffer the fates of cottagers who 
previously owned no land of their own but could wring 
sustenance from the village common, but who, after an 
enclosure, become landless save for their little garden plots, and 
so must find masters in order to stay alive and feed their 
families. 
Should the seas become enclosed, may not ships be forced to 
pay tolls and transit fees along routes which formerly were free? 
And may not fishermen become merely rent-paying tenants and 
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licensees as if states held the divided fields of the formerly com-
mon oceans in fee? The costs, which these tolls and rents would 
add to all commodities drawn from or moved across the sea, 
would inevitably fall, like infamous excise taxes, most heavily 
upon the poorest and those least likely to reap an equivalent 
benefit from being able to impose similar charges in their turn. 
The smaller states would thus be excluded from the major 
benefits of an enclosure of the oceans, but they would still bear a 
disproportionate share of the higher costs and prices which 
would result from the engrossment of the oceanic commons into 
the exclusive patrimonies of coastal states.64 
IL THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
INTERPRET AT/ON-SELECTION 
89 
The negotiating significance of asserting the customary law 
status of the Group of 77's definition of the mineral resources of 
the deep ocean bed as the common heritage of mankind and, in 
Ambassador Pinto's terms, as res publicae, is that countries with 
a seabed mining technology are thereby precluded from bargain-
ing for diplomatic concessions as a quid pro quo for their accep-
tance of Article 137 of the Treaty65 and all the other provisions 
predicated upon it. Indeed, it is the possibility of thus reversing 
the bargaining postures of the negotiating parties, so that the in-
dustrialized democracies can be represented as seeking, rather 
than granting, concessions which explains the vehemence of the 
Group of 77's spokesmen in advancing their quite baroque argu-
ment. 
It was a bold bid. If, under customary international law, those 
countries' enterprises are already precluded from mining, then 
they can be called upon to make concessions to gain that privilege 
under the Treaty. If, on the other hand, customary international 
law remains unchanged, then Article 137 of the Treaty reflects a 
desideratum of the countries which lack deepsea mining 
technology but which are determined to participate in its conduct 
no less than in its advantages. Article 137's definition of the com-
mon heritage, under such circumstances, would have to be paid for 
by reciprocal concessions to the technologically advanced coun-
tries in the all-important areas of technology transfer, access, 
64. Goldie, Modest Proposal, supra note 43, at 336-37. 
65. See supra note 47. 
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representation and taxation. Here again, hesitancy and reluctant 
consent have prevented the United States and the other Western 
democracies from pressing their just and lawful claims for the due 
recognition and respect for their currently existing rights under 
the customary international law doctrine of the freedom of the 
high seas.66 
To the extent that the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea 
would abridge the existing customary international law rights of 
acquisition over seabed resources, it is important to be clear-
headed about the consequences of accepting that abridgment with 
neither adequate safeguards nor an appropriate quid pro quo. This 
would be tantamount to the expropriation of valuable United 
States interests, expectations and claims. Accordingly, it is incum-
bent on the United States to realize clearly the expropriatory 
aspects of the Treaty's present provisions. These are presently 
contrary to the mandate contained in the Deep Seabed Hard 
Mineral Resources Act of 1980.67 In passing the Act, Congress in-
tended that any international agreement to which the United 
States might become a party should provide, in part: (1) assured 
and non-discriminatory access to the deep seabed hard mineral 
resources; (2) security of tenure to U.S. citizens whose rights have 
accrued prior to the Treaty's entry into force with respect to the 
United States; (3) continued exploration and recovery activities on 
the part of U.S. citizens to the maximum extent practicable consis-
tent with the Treaty; and (4) protection of interim investment.68 
In addition to these four stipulations, which constitute a Con-
gressional instruction to the Department of State and to the U.S. 
Delegation, the Act puts all states participating in the Conference 
on notice of the conditions precedent for the United States' 
satisfaction with the Treaty. Yet, these clearly expressed direc-
tives would appear to have been more honored in the breach than 
the observance, as far as the existing seabed mining provisions of 
the Law of the Sea Treaty are concerned. In contrast with Con-
gress' policy directives regarding the content of the Convention, 
66. See Friedheim, A rvid Pardo, the Law of the Sea Conference, and the Future of 
the Oceans, in MANAGING OCEAN RESOURCES: A PRIMER 137, 149 (Friedheim ed. 1979). For a 
discussion of this contribution to the Law of the Sea Debate, see Goldie, A Selection of 
Views: Part //, supra note 63, at 494-96. 
67. 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
68. 30 u.s.c. § 1401(b). 
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the present Treaty testifies to the Conference's objective, 
especially in the seabed mining context, of shackling the United 
States' technology to the chariot wheels of the triumphant New 
International Economic Order. 
!IL THE UNITED STATES' EXPLANATIONS OF ITS VOTE 
FOR THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES 
A. A GENERAL OBSERVATION 
Judge Sir Robert Jennings asserted that one state cannot be 
bound by another's interpretation of an instrument such as the 
Declaration of Principles, and that each state's own explanation of 
the vote it gave in the First Committee of the General Assembly, 
as well as of its contemporary or relevant statements as to its 
understanding, should provide the measure of its assumption of 
obligations, if any, stemming from the Declaration.69 Therefore, 
such explanations, statements and avowals by key officials of the 
United States should be reviewed. In the meantime, the following 
extracts will show that, while acceptance of the common heritage 
formula is widespread, if not universal, it remains without the 
specific agreed-upon content or applicability which Ambassador 
Pinto and his colleagues seek to give it. Indeed, one can equally 
justify the proposition that what the doctrine may indicate is a 
right of access by all states to the exploration and exploitation of 
the minerals of the ocean. 
Before reviewing the specific and diverse statements made by 
the representatives of the states voting in the General Assembly, 
reference should be made to Ambassador Amersinghe's comment 
on the lack of consensus in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction. He wrote, in a letter to the Chairman of the First Com-
mittee of the General Assembly: 
As a result of these consultations, a draft Declaration has emerged 
which, in my opinion, reflects the highest degree of agreement at-
tainable at the present time. It does not, however, represent a consensus 
of all the members of the Committee.698 
69. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
69a. See Letter dated 24 November 1970 from the Chairman of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdic-
tion addressed to the Chairman of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.542 (November 
25, 1970) (issued in mimeographed form only), reproduced in the Appendix. 
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These words are especially significant because of their author's 
special eminence, qualifications, and objectivity. 
Furthermore, the diversity of the explanations which the 
delegates gave for their votes in the General Assembly testifies to 
the fact that no one interpretation was generally accepted at the 
time of the vote. This is underscored by the fact that the term 
"common heritage" was left undefined in the Declaration. The 
meaning which Ambassador Pinto70 and the Group of Legal Ex-
perts71 now seek to consecrate cannot be regarded as founded in 
any kind of general consensus such as they seek to attribute to the 
vote taken on the General Principles Resolution. Indeed, far from 
having the legislative effect which the Group of Legal Experts 
claim in their Manifesto, 72 the meaning of common heritage has to 
date received neither a universal opinio juris, nor general support 
in state practice. Both of these two necessary conditions must be 
shown to exist before the regime contemplated in the Declaration 
of Principles can validly be said to have replaced the existing 
positive norms, established rights, immunities, and privileges 
which are guaranteed by the freedom of the seas. While two con-
tradictory theories of common heritage (contrast the analogy of 
the common well from which all may freely draw their water with 
the res publicae definition) are equally inchoate, neither can be 
claimed to define the law here and now. On the other hand, if some 
generally accepted customary rule supports one, but not the 
other, then that one should be preferred. Clearly, the freedom of 
the high seas, which still prevails, justifies the common well 
analogy and excludes the res publicae definition. On this basis, 
then, the common well definition, not the Pinto definition, should 
have been insisted upon as the preferred starting point of negotia-
tions. 
B. THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIGNIFICANCE 
OF ITS AFFIRMATIVE VOTE FOR THE 1970 DECLARATION OF 
PRINCIPLES AND OF RELATED RESOLUTIONS 
1. The Diplomatic Rather than Legislative Quality of the 
Declaration of Principles 
When the Declaration of Principles Resolution was being 
70. See supra notes 13, 47 and accompanying text. 
71. See supra note 20. 
72. See supra note 21 and the accompanying text. See also supra note 49. 
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reviewed in the First Committee of the United Nations General 
Assembly prior to its presentation to the Plenary of the General 
Assembly, the United States, which had taken a leading part in 
the negotiation of the compromise formula which the Seabeds 
Committee had finally agreed upon, stated to the world its 
understanding that the Declaration was of a diplomatic and com-
promissory nature: 
One of the most difficult aspects of reaching agreement on a 
declaration of principles was the need, recognized by all who par-
ticipated in the work, to avoid prejudicing the positions of States 
regarding resolution 257 4D (XXIV). A careful study of the 
declaration as a whole, particularly the third paragraph of the 
preamble and operative paragraphs 3 through 6, shows that due 
to the goodwill and skill of all our colleagues this has been ac-
complished satisfactorily. 78 
2. Preservation of the Freedom of the High Seas 
President Nixon, in his Oceans Policy Statement of May 23, 
1970, stressed the continuing right of the states engaging in the 
negotiations for a seabed mining regime to continue exercising the 
freedom of the high seas. He pointed out: 
I do not, however, believe that it is either necessary or desirable 
to try to halt exploration and exploitation of the sea-beds beyond 
a depth of 200 meters during the negotiating period. 
Accordingly, I call on all other nations to join the United 
States in an interim policy .... The regime should accordingly 
include due protection for the integrity of investments made in 
the interim period.74 
Even in the early days of the negotiations there was little con-
sensus regarding the meaning of the common heritage. Thus, in 
1971 the staff of the United States Senate Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, in The Law of the Sea Crisis observed: 
Late last year the General Assembly adopted a "Declaration 
of Legal Principles" (Resolution 27 49 (XXV) of December 17, 
1970). It included these words: 
73. 25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1799th mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1799 (1970). 
74. Statement by President Nixon on the Oceans Policy of the United States, May 23, 
1970. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/22. See also Oceanography Miscellaneous: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Oceanography of the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. On Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries on Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 
25-26 (1972). 
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The seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter 
referred to as the area), as well as the resources of the 
area, are the common heritage of mankind. 
This idea of common heritage was said to be the base of a future 
Law-of-the-Sea Convention and to lay the foundation for the con-
trol of the international seabeds area. While the delegates at 
Geneva this summer frequently included in their presentations a 
reference to "common heritage," there was no agreement on the 
meaning of the concept. 76 
Without a universally accepted treaty definition or the develop-
ment, by widespread state practice, of a customary norm replac-
ing the freedom of the high seas, the freedom of access inherent in 
freedom of the high seas remains the norm. 
3. The Moratorium Resolution's Failure to be Accepted as 
Legally Obligatory 
References to the Moratorium Resolution's failure to achieve 
a general consensus, although it did receive sufficient affirmative 
votes to qualify as having been approved by the General 
Assembly, is significant. Had it reflected consensus, it would have 
justified arguments leading to the conclusion that, by agreement, 
the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas no longer applied to 
the minerals of the deep ocean floor beyond the jurisdiction of any 
state. 
(a) The Special Subcommittee on the Outer Continental 
Shelf stated, in its Report on the Outer Continental Shelf to the 
United States Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
that: 
The United States also opposed the Moratorium Resolution, 
which declared a moratorium on all exploitation of the seabed 
resources pending the establishment of an international deepsea 
regime. 
With regard to an interim policy, the President suggested 
that all permits for exploration and exploitation be issued sub-
ject to the international regime to be agreed upon, with a portion 
75. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess., REPORT ON THE LA w OF THE SEA CRISIS 6 (Comm. Print 1971). 
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of the revenues from interim exploitation to be paid to an ap-
propriate international development agency .76 
95 
(b) Charles N. Brower, Esq., Acting Legal Adviser, Depart-
ment of State, and Acting Chairman, Inter-Agency Task Force on 
the Law of the Sea wrote the following in a letter to Mrs. Leonor 
K. Sullivan, Chairperson, United States House of Representatives 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, and informed her of 
the failure, in the U.N. General Assembly, of further initiatives 
regarding the reiteration of the Moratorium Resolution: 
One other significant development at this General 
Assembly, fortunately in keeping with the spirit that dominated 
the negotiation of the Conference Resolution, was the fact that 
no new resolution calling for a moratorium on deep seabed ac-
tivities was introduced .... [We] believe that the avoidance of a 
renewed and divisive debate on this subject was related to the 
general attempts to ensure the best possible atmosphere as we 
enter the final stage of preparatory work this year. Needless to 
say, our own opposition to the moratorium remains unchanged.77 
(c) John R. Stevenson, Esq., Chairman, Inter-Agency Law of 
the Sea Task Force and Legal Adviser, Department of State, 
stated in a letter to the Honorable Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, 
United States Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
dated May 19, 1972: 
As you know, at the 24th General Assembly in 1969, a 
resolution commonly known as the "Moratorium Resolution" was 
passed despite significant "no" votes and abstentions. The 
Resolution purports to prohibit exploitation of the resources of 
the area of seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, 
76. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF. 91st Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT 
ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF TO THE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS 4, 24 
(Comm. Print 1970). 
77. Hearings on H.R. 9 & H.R. 7732 ("Deep Seabed Hard Minerals'~ Before the Sub-
comm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) (letter from Charles N. Brower, Esq., Acting Legal Adviser, 
Department of State and Acting Chairman, Inter-Agency Task Force on the Law of the Sea, 
to Mrs. Leonor K. Sullivan, Chairperson, U.S. House of Representatives Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries Comm., May 16, 1973). See also id. at 25 (statement of Hon. Charles N. 
Brower) and Hearings ("Status Report on the Law of the Sea Conference·~ Before the Sub-
comm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of U.S. Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, at 23 (1973) (letter by Hon. Charles N. Brower to Hon. Henry 
M. Jackson, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, March 1, 1973). 
27
Goldie: The Common Heritage Of Mankind.
Published by SURFACE, 1983
96 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol.10:69 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, pending the establish-
ment of an internationally agreed regime for the area. The 
United States is not legally bound by this Resolution, although it 
is required to give good faith consideration to the Resolution in 
determining its policies. 
In his May 23, 1970 Oceans Policy Statement, President Nix-
on indicated that it is neither necessary nor desirable to try to 
halt exploration and exploitation of the seabeds beyond a depth 
of 200 meters during the negotiating process. He also called on 
other nations to join the U.S. in an interim policy and suggested 
that all permits for exploration and exploitation of the seabeds 
beyond 200 meters be issued subject to the international regime 
to be agreed upon. He stated that the regime should include due 
protection for the integrity of investments made in the interim 
period.78 
(d) Again, in a statement entitled "Oceanography 
Miscellaneous: Geneva U .N. Seabed Committee" dated September 
26, 1972, before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the United 
States House of Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries, Mr. Stevenson observed that: 
One issue that we had feared would be very disruptive and 
prevent constructive work last summer fortunately did not 
prove to be as difficult as might have been anticipated. The 
delegation of Kuwait had, at the end of the spring session, in-
troduced a moratorium resolution prohibiting activities with a 
view to exploitation of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdic-
tion until the establishment of an international regime. Con-
sideration was postponed until the summer session. However, at 
the summer session, this issue was not extensively discussed un-
til very late in the session. The Kuwait delegation did not press 
for adoption or a vote on the issue, and was content to have its 
proposal included in the report of the committee. It will of course 
be before us in the General Assembly, and I think it is prudent to 
anticipate that action may be taken on this proposal at the 
General Assembly. 
Of course, the General Assembly took similar action in 1969, 
and UNCTAD took similar action just this spring. We continue 
78. Hearings on S.2801 ("Development of Hard Mineral Resources of Deep Seabed'~ 
Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75 (1972) (letter from John R. Stevenson, Chair-
man, Inter-Agency Law of the Sea Task Force, and Legal Adviser, Department of State, to 
Senator Henry M. Jackson, May 19, 1972). 
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to take the position that such a resolution is legally ineffective 
and disruptive of our progress in achieving an international 
regime, which is the only permanent solution to be envisaged in 
this area. 
With respect to this issue, we again had to answer the argu-
ment of a number of countries that the declaration of principles 
regarding the seabed adopted in 1970 without any dissenting 
vote by the General Assembly, somehow implied, in light of the 
common heritage principle, that there could not be any exploita-
tion until an international regime had been adopted. We of 
course continued to state - and we were supported in this by a 
number of other countries - that common heritage does not 
mean common property.79 
97 
Later in the same Hearings, Mr. Ratiner added this further 
gloss to Mr. Stevenson's remarks regarding the relevant General 
Assembly resolutions on a moratorium and on legal principles (in-
cluding the common heritage clause): 
The original United Nations General Assembly principles 
were the product of a great deal of compromise, and accordingly 
there is considerable ambiguity in those principles, an ambiguity 
which cannot easily be carried over into a treaty which will 
govern large commercial investment. It is simply too ambiguous, 
so that the negotiation now taking place is an attempt to define 
what those principles really mean in treaty language, and the 
principles themselves can only be seen as guidelines. I think 
most delegations in the Seabeds Committee working group 
understand that that is the case. And, indeed, I think the work 
product of Subcommittee I's working group reflects the fact that 
many principles were changed in the course of the negotiations 
and new texts were produced which, in important respects, do 
not directly reflect what some delegations thought the principles 
meant when they were adopted by the General Assembly.80 
C. SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS REFLECTING THE CONTINUED 
UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMMON HERITAGE 
In addition to finding states' understandings of the meaning 
of the term common heritage in their explanations of the votes 
79. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography on "Oceanography 
Miscellaneous" of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 237, 
242 (1972) (statement by John R. Stevenson, Esq., et al., to the Subcomm. on Oceanography 
of the House of Representatives Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries). 
80. Id. at 250. 
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they gave in the General Assembly,81 evidence of their perceptions 
is also available in their subsequent statements. Such statements 
shed light on the established and continuing meanings which were 
given at the time of the vote or signature. These subsequent facts, 
statements, and conduct are relevant only in a subordinate capaci-
ty, however. They do not establish an authoritative meaning, but 
they may be significant to corroborate and explain the intentions, 
understandings, points of view and premises of policy affirmed at 
the date of the vote. An analogy is found in the international law 
theory of the critical date.82 Thus, in the Island of Palmas Case,88 
Judge Huber stated: 
The events falling between the Treaty of Paris, December 10, 
1898, and the rise of the present dispute in 1906, cannot in 
themselves serve to indicate the legal situation of the island at 
the critical moment when the cession of the Philippines by Spain 
took place. They are however indirectly of a certain interest, 
owing to the light they might throw on the period immediately 
preceding. 84 
Again, in his separate opinion in the Minquiers and Ecrehos 
Case, Judge Basdevant considered the critical date of that case to 
be October 24, 1360, the date of the Treaty of Bretigny or Calais.85 
He considered that as a result of the Treaty's separation of 
English from Continental or French Normandy, dealings by each 
country in connection with the Minquiers and Ecrehos islets and 
reefs should be regarded as detailed applications of the division 
made in 1360 and thus further explaining it. It was on this basis 
that facts after 1360 right up to the date of the Compromis 
(December 29, 1950) were admitted.86 These later events should 
not be regarded as having independent probative value; their 
function is merely to resolve issues of detail and to elaborate fur-
ther upon the meaning of the Treaty. Similarly, subsequent ex-
planatory pronouncements further the original and continuing 
81. See, Jennings, supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
82. For a conspectus of this doctrine, see Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 INT'L & COMP. 
L.Q. 1251 (1963). For a discussion of the problem of subsequent facts, see id. at 1254-55. 
83. The Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1928). 
84. Id. at 125. 
85. The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 1953 l.C.J. 4, 76-84 (Order of January 29, 1953) 
(separate opinion of Judge Basdevant). 
86. Id. at 83-84. 
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understanding of the United States regarding its vote in favor of 
the common heritage clause of the Declaration of Principles. 
A selection of such elucidatory glosses by leading United 
States spokesmen with respect to the freedom of access (and so, 
by necessary implication, to the Declaration of Principles and the 
Moratorium Resolution) follows: 
(1) Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger at the Hotel 
Pierre, New York City on Thursday, April 8, 1976, before the 
Foreign Policy Association, the United States Council of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce and the United Nations Associa-
tion of the United States of America: 
The conference has not yet approached agreement on the issue 
of the deep seabeds because it has confronted serious 
philosophical disagreements. Some have argued that commer~ial 
exploration unrestrained by international treaty would be in the 
best interests of the United States. In fact this country is many 
years ahead of any other in the technology of deep sea mining, 
and we are in all respects prepared to protect our interests. If 
the deep seabeds are not subject to international agreement the 
United States can and will proceed to explore and mine on its 
own.87 
What the United States cannot accept is that the right of ac-
cess to seabed minerals be limited exclusively to an international 
authority or be so severely restricted as effectively to deny ac-
cess to the firms of any individual nation, including our own. We 
are gratified to note an increasing awareness of the need to 
avoid such extreme positions and to move now to a genuine ac-
commodation that would permit reasonable assurances to all 
states and their nationals that their access to resources will not 
be denied.88 
(2) Remarks of Secretary of State Kissinger at a reception at 
the United States Mission for the Heads of Delegations attending 
the Fifth Session of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Con-
ference, New York, New York, September l, 1976: 
With respect to the deep seabeds, we face two realities. One is 
that developed countries - a few developed countries at this 
moment-alone possess the technology with which to exploit the 
87. Kissinger, The Law of the Sea: A Test of International Cooperation, in FOREIGN 
POLICY ASSOCIATION, PRESENTATION OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER 3, 14 (1976). 
88. Id. at 15. 
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seabeds-why don't I use a more happy word?-to mine the 
seabeds. 
On the other hand, there is the concept that the deep 
seabeds represent the common heritage of mankind and, 
therefore, there is a certain conflict between the realities of the 
capabilities of certain countries and the theoretical conviction of 
many other countries. 
From the point of view of those who possess the technology, 
many of the proposals that have already been made represent 
very significant concessions in the sense that they represent 
self-imposed restrictions on what would otherwise be an 
unrestricted freedom of action. 
From the point of view of many of the developing countries 
some of the these concessions, in view of their convictions, are 
not considered concessions at all but tend to be taken for 
granted.89 
(3) Statement in 1980 by Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson, 
then the United States President's Special Representative for the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, to San-
ford H. Winston, Vice-President, National Association of Manufac-
turers Communications Department and member of the United 
States Delegation to the Conference in 1978 and 1979, in an inter-
view: 
Richardson: There is nothing in international law to prevent 
anyone from exploring or exploiting deep seabed resources as an 
exercise of high seas freedoms. Only by ratifying a treaty in 
force would a government agree to limit the exercise of those 
rights. But it is no secret that our view of what is and is not per-
missible under international law is shared by precious few other 
governments. Witness the repeated and strong statements on 
the subject made at the Law of the Sea Conference and 
elsewhere by spokesmen for the Group of 77, now representing 
some 120 countries of the 158 that participate in the conference. 
If, in the end, we are unable to negotiate the kind of seabed 
regime we believe necessary to assure access, we will certainly 
support the rights of U.S. citizens as we interpret them in inter-
national law. Just as certain is the fact that mining in the 
absence of a treaty will produce challenge and conflict, at a 
minimum in the legal and political forums available to the great 
majority of countries that hold seabed resources to be inviolable. 
89. Press Release USUN-90 (76) (Aug. 13, 1976). 
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I firmly believe the stability afforded by a universally acclaimed, 
equitable seabed mining regime is worth the pursuit.90 
101 
(4) In additon to statements made by key individuals in the 
Executive Branch of the Government with authority to reflect the 
United States' position, the Congress too has gone on record with 
its "findings and purposes", "intent" and instructions. It has un-
equivocally defined its position, inter alia, in the following affir-
mances: 
(a) "Findings and Purposes" 
(i) "Findings" 
(7) on December 17, 1970, the United States supported (by 
affirmative vote) the United Nations General Assembly Resolu-
tion 27 49 (XXV) declaring inter alia the principle that the 
mineral resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of 
mankind, with the expectation that this principle would be legal-
ly defined under the terms of a comprehensive international Law 
of the Sea Treaty yet to be agreed upon: 
(12) it is the legal opinion of the United States that ex-
ploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral resources 
of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas subject to a du-
ty of reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their 
exercise of those and other freedoms of the high seas subject to a 
duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their 
exercise of those and other freedoms recognized by general prin-
ciples of international law.91 
(ii) "Purposes" 
(2) pending the ratification by, and entering into force with 
respect to, the United States of such a Treaty, to provide for 
establishment of an international revenue-sharing fund the pro-
ceeds of which shall be used for sharing with the international 
community pursuant to such Treaty; 
(3) to establish, pending the ratification by, and entering 
into force with respect to, the United States of such a Treaty, an 
interim program to regulate the exploration for and commercial 
recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed by United 
States citizens;92 
90. Elliot L. Richardson on Deep Seabed Mining, ENTERPRISE 18, 19 (Feb. 1980). 
91. 30 U.S.C. § 140l(a). 
92. 30 u.s.c. § 140l(b). 
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(b) "Intent" and instructions 
It is the intent of Congress -
(1) that any international agreement to which the United 
States becomes a party should, in addition to promoting other 
national oceans objectives -
(A) provide assured and nondiscriminatory access, 
under reasonable terms and conditions, to the hard 
mineral resources of the deep seabed for United States 
citizens, and 
(B) provide security of tenure by recognizing the 
rights of United States citizens who have undertaken ex-
ploration or commercial recovery under title I before 
such agreement enters into force with respect to the 
United States to continue their operations under terms, 
conditions, and restrictions which do not impose signifi-
cant new economic burdens upon such citizens with 
respect to such operations with the effect of preventing 
the continuation of such operations on a viable economic 
basis; 
(2) that the extent to which any such international agree-
ment conforms to the provisions of paragraph (1) should be deter-
mined by the totality of the provisions of such agreement, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the practical implications for the 
security of investments of any discretionary powers granted to an 
international regulatory body, the structures and decisionmaking 
procedures of such body, the availability of impartial and effective 
procedures for the settlement of disputes, and any features that 
tend to discriminate against exploration and commercial recovery 
activities undertaken by United States citizens .. .. 93 
D. EXPRESSIONS OF UNDERSTANDING BY SOME NON-U.S. 
DELEGATIONS AND EMINENT PERSONS 
(1) With regard to the Moratorium Resolution, the British Delega-
tion explained its vote in the following terms, inter alia: "We do 
not believe that the General Assembly can or should by its recom-
mendations purport to modify existing international law."94 
(2) The Soviet Union, in the same forum, expressed the view 
that: "[T]he operative part [of the Moratorium Resolution] is so 
phrased that it can be interpreted as infringing the freedom of the 
open seas sanctioned by international law."95 
93. 30 u.s.c. § 1441. 
94. 24 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1709th mtg.) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1709 (1969). 
95. Id. at 17. 
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(3) Mr. Amerasinghe, then the President of the Conference, and 
a leader of the Group of 77, stated the following (and typically ac-
curate) understanding of the Declaration of Principles: 
The Declaration cannot claim the binding force of a treaty inter-
nationally negotiated and accepted, but it is a definite step in 
that direction and no less than the other two Declarations that 
have been adopted at this session, it has-if I may adapt the 
words of Walt Whitman-that fervent element of moral authori-
ty that is more binding than treaties .... [W]e may assign vary-
ing degrees of significance and validity to the Declaration, but 
we can all agree that its conspicuous merit is its daring originali-
ty and that its real virtue is its moral force.96 
(4) In the First Committee of the General Assembly, Mr. Galindo 
Pohl, Chairman of the Legal Subcommittee of the Seabeds Com-
mittee, and a very prominent member of the Group of 77's delega-
tion, clearly viewed the Declaration of Principles as not qualifying 
as "instant customary international law."97 He pointed out that: 
[T]hat draft is not and is not intended to be a provisional regime 
governing the exploitation of the seabed. Thus we must 
recognize that this understanding loomed large in all our 
negotiations; it was accepted by all parties independent of the 
positions they may have taken on the problems of maritime law. 
Therefore, the declaration is a first step toward that regime, but 
it is not yet the regime.98 
(5) The United Kingdom Delegation explained its affirmative 
vote on the Declaration of Principles in terms of what it 
characterized as a general reservation which it couched in the 
following clear terms: 
[L]ike any other resolution of the General Assembly, the draft 
declaration has in itself no binding force. Secondly and arising 
from this, it must be regarded as a whole and interpreted as a 
whole; as a whole it has no dispositive effect until we have agree-
ment on an international regime and, as part of that agreement, 
we have a clear, precise and internationally accepted definition 
of the area to which the regime is to apply.99 
(6) The Soviet Union, following its enduring policy of strongly 
disapproving of any presumption of any attribution of legislative 
96. 25 U.N. GAOR c.l, (1933d mtg.) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1933 (1970). 
97. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
98. 25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1781st mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1781 (1970). 
99. 25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1799th mtg.) at l, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1799 (1970). 
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competence to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
pointed out: "Needless to say, adoption of the declaration by the 
General Assembly cannot create legal consequences for States in 
view of the well-known fact that decisions of the General 
Assembly have simply the force of recommendations."100 
(7) Ambassador Galindo Pohl, who had a key role in the negotia-
tions and drafting of the Declaration of Principles Resolution, ex-
plained, in the First Committee of the General Assembly when the 
Resolution was being reviewed there prior to presentation to the 
Plenary, the compromissory result of negotiations which led to the 
favorable reception of the common heritage of mankind formula in 
the General Assembly, as follows: 
Nor does the draft declaration endorse or undermine the so-
called moratorium that was the subject of a General Assembly 
resolution at its twenty-fourth session. In the course of the 
negotiations, conflicting interests were reconciled in the sense 
that the declaration of principles would be neither of two things: 
either a provisional regime or a restatement of the moratorium. 
On these points the draft declaration reflects a clear desire to be 
neutral.101 
E. A RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW 
(1) Theodore Kronmiller, in his book The Lawfulness of Deep 
Seabed Mining, reinforces the foregoing isolated statements by 
reporting more generally on the voting on the Declaration of Prin-
ciples Resolution: 
Clearly, views expressed concerning the meaning of the 
common heritage of mankind evidenced a wide disparity of 
opinions. It bears repeating that, although other operative provi-
sions of the General Principles Resolution gave further content 
to the concept, these provisions were also the subjects of greatly 
differing interpretations. Following adoption of the Resolution, 
other efforts were made to define the concept, but as will be seen 
below, most of the gaps could not be bridged.102 
(2) Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee itself reported in 1968, on the 
divergent positions of its members: 
A very large number of members expressed the view that the 
100. 25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1798th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1798 (1970). 
101. 25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1781th mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1781 (1970). 
102. KRONMILLER, supra note 53, at 266. 
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area beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction was not 
susceptible of appropriation and that States could not exercise 
national sovereignty over such an area. Other members noted 
that there was a distinction between non-appropriation of the 
sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of present national 
jurisdiction and the exploitation of these areas.103 
IV. CONCLUSION 
105 
An important question remains: If the varying definitions of 
the common heritage of mankind principle differ so fundamentally, 
and if the United States had, over the years, unswervingly 
adhered to the common pasture or common well analogy, how can 
so many representatives of such a large number of countries have 
ignored the reiterated statements by responsible American 
representatives whose utterances were made both in the course of 
the treaty-making process and in major policy pronouncements 
about it? The answer may, sadly, be in the Delegation's conscien-
tious pursuit of the ultimate chimera of the Conference, the 
"Yesable Proposition." 104 (By a "yesable proposition" -which he 
did not clearly define-Professor Fisher, its author, would appear 
to have meant a concrete proposal which would at least minimally 
satisfy the offeror while inducing his vis-a-vis to abandon his rejec-
tionist posture and accept the offer.) Can such a proposition, 
especially in the multi-faceted context of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, be found which could satisfy all 
sides? A brief outline of that sort of discussion now can be put for-
ward. The underlying assumption of this prescription is that 
negotiators will always prefer to formulate their claims in clear 
and precise language, that they will always seek compromise 
rather than confrontation, and that a proposition can always be 
found which could satisfy all sides. This assumption is a common 
professional myopia of lawyers, and has been cogently commented 
upon by the late Judge Charles de Visscher: 
The man of law is naturally liable to misunderstand the 
character of political tensions and the conflicts to which they 
give rise. He is inclined to see in them only "the object of litiga-
tion"; to cast in terms of legal dialectic what is in the highest 
degree of refractory to reasoning, to reduce to order what is 
103. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and 
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction at 44, U.N. Doc. A/7230 (1968). 
104. R. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS (1969) (Chapter II is entitled 
Give Them a Yesable Proposition). 
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essentially unbridled dynamism, in a word to depoliticize what is 
undiluted politics .... The most serious tensions are obviously 
those where the stake is a new distribution of elements con-
stituting the relative power of states such as territory ... [and] 
raw materials. Here reason vainly searches for a criterion, com-
ing to a dead stop before the historical individuality of the 
State.105 
Indeed an analysis of the history of the United States Draft 
for a United Nations Convention on the International Seabed 
A rea106 illustrates some of the difficulties involved with the 
yesable proposition. In that draft document the United States 
made an offer which at the time was thought by its sponsors to be 
highly "yesable" by the Group of '17. No doubt, had the American 
diplomacy been different, it might have been "yessed." But, 
because the package put forward was seen by the Soviet Bloc and 
the Group of 77 merely as America's first bid, it was given a bare-
ly polite reception. Those groups, in fact, were enabled to appraise 
it as inviting forceful or claiming tactics. So now, sadly, that well-
intended draft is a dead letter .107 
The result of the mode of its presentation and of the advocacy 
of this generous, honest and potentially effective document, had a 
further deleterious effect. In the subsequent, long drawn-out 
negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, the United States was forced into a defensive, even a 
self-justificatory, if not self-deprecatory, posture after its draft was 
unveiled, as if that offer were a dishonest claim to pre-empt the 
world's resources on behalf of its own nationals. This characteriza-
tion was far from the truth. The draft's proponents envisaged it as 
the proposal of a disinterested ideal. It offered the blueprint for an 
organization which was intended to develop a sharing of wealth, 
an organ of international cooperation capable of augmenting 
developmental aid, and a needed enhancement of the revenues of 
the United Nations. Far from masking a grab at resources, the 
105. c. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (Corbett 
trans. 1968). 
106. United States Draft of U.N. Convention on International Seabed Areas, 9 l.L.M. 
1046 (1970) [hereinafter cited as United States Draft]. 
107. For Cassandra-like forebodings in this regard, see Goldie, The United States 
Draft for a United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area-A ''Polite Con-
versation," 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 123 (1971) (Proceedings of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law at its Sixty-fifth Annual Meeting) [hereinafter cited as Goldie, United States 
Draft]. 
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draft could only have been established at the expense of 
diminishing the economic advantages of the United States' own 
nationals and enterprises. Indeed, the fate of this testimony of 
American goodwill poignantly and concretely reinforces Dr. Her-
man Kahn's criticism of Professor Fisher's book, where the former 
said, in part: 
In those situations in which there is not sufficient mutual in-
terest to strike an acceptable bargain, the net thrust of Mr. 
Fisher's insights is likely to give excessive and rather effective 
ammunition to those urging concession and compromise. That is, 
in many ways Mr. Fisher's recommendations can be used to 
generate psychological pressures, arguments, and even 
misleadingly seductive and seemingly neutral observations that 
are actually recommendations for making concessions and com-
promises - or even more important, creating the conditions for 
such concession and compromise. For this reason politicians, the 
humanists, idealists, utopians and the amateur citizens are going 
to find this book more sweepingly persuasive than many of the 
ideologically committed or even some of the relatively hard-
headed and tough-minded (in the William Jam es sense) 
bargainers.108 
In following up this perceptive comment, it may be observed 
that the experiences of the Western European and Other Group109 
in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea are 
represented in the sketch on the dust jacket of Fisher's book. He 
shows two fencers, one in the lunge, the other in the en garde 
posture. The former's attention is distracted by a carrot on the lat-
ter's rapier. (The yesable proposition?) But what if our lunging 
duelist rejects the Fisher horoscopy of his reaction and, instead, 
remembers elementary economics lessons about satisfaction defer-
red? If he does not allow himself to be tempted or deflected by one 
108. FISHER, supra note 104, reviewed by H. Kahn, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1969, § 7 (book 
reviews), at 72-73. 
109. The "Western European and Other Group" is one of five political caucus groups in 
the General Assembly. These groups have semi-official recognition, especially in the terms 
of memberships at committees and bureaux. (Thus the bureaux are always five in number to 
accomodate each Group.) The Other Groups are: The Eastern European Group, the Asian 
Group, the African Group, and the Latin American Group. The term "Other" of the 
"Western European and Other Group" is intended to indicate the membership of such coun-
tries as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc. which caucus with the 
Western European nations but which, obviously, are not geographically part of that divided 
continent. 
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carrot, how many more may be the reward of aggressive 
behavior?11° Furthermore, what if his intention is not to formulate 
specific demands in terms of a legal dialectic and as objects of 
litigation but to create a situation of unbridled dynamism in order 
to bring about "a new distribution of elements constituting the 
relative power of states such as . . . raw materials," 111 or to 
achieve, in the language of the champions of the New Interna-
tional Economic Order, "the transference of wealth and power to 
the countries of the developing world?" 112 
As a result of its misconception of many of the premises of 
negotiation in a revolutionary, dynamic situation, the Fisher 
"yesable proposition" has proved to be a way of losing, not gain-
ing, diplomatic goals. By heightening expectations and placing a 
premium, in fact, although not in intention, on encouraging those 
who claim to try upping the ante, the proposition offers self-
defeating advice. The "yesable proposition" can thus be seen as 
creating dilemmas for the original offeror. It can also provide a po-
tent means of straining international friendships, through 
misunderstandings and future claims, as the Law of the Sea 
negotiations also testify. Indeed, the United States' good natured 
and well-intended search for a "yesable proposition" at the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has led to much 
of the hesitant and tentative "yes, but ... " diplomacy which was 
an unhappy characteristic of the U.S. Delegation's bargaining with 
the more tough-minded representatives at the Conference. Our 
diplomats were looking for the precisely formulated com-
promissory solutions of the man of law in a context of unbridled 
dynamism. In such an arena, the contention will always be, as it 
always has been, between competing ideologies. It continually 
states contests in which one contender's approach is that of the 
relative will power of states, while the man of law is under the 
disadvantage of seeking to formulate a logical, equitable, and 
legalistic distribution of resources. The basic error of the U.S. 
Delegation has been to mistake for legal, and therefore rationally 
arguable differences, what in reality are "questions of power and 
tests of one's nerves and strength."113 
110. In large part it was the expectations for that diplomatic scenario that led to this 
writer's skepticism back in 1971. See Goldie, United States Draft, supra note 107, at 123-33. 
111. See DE VISSCHER, supra note 105 and the accompanying text. 
112. See e.g., R. MEAGHER, supra note 17, passim. 
113. DE VISSCHER, supra note 105, at 79. 
40
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1983], Art. 7
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/7
1983] The Common Heritage of Mankind 109 
Befogged and bedevilled by its earnest search for that ever-
receding will-o'-the-wisp, the U.S. Delegation seemed to give an in-
tended appearance of divided counsels and of bewildered com-
plaisance. Such a manifestation of good-natured indecision may 
well have encouraged determined supporters of the res publicae 
definition of the common heritage into believing that their cam-
paign to dissuade the United States from its earlier support of the 
common well or common pasture definition was on the brink of vic-
tory. Unhappily, the closer the Delegation appeared to be shuffl-
ing towards an acceptance of the res publicae interpretation, the 
more the gulf widened between what it and what Congress and 
the White House could accept. The Congress and the President in-
creasingly insisted upon the stipulations set forth in Section 201 of 
the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, or 
equivalent policies. The 1980 Act, for example, expresses the in-
tention of Congress that any agreement to which the United 
States might become a party should provide for the enjoyment by 
U.S. citizens and enterprises of: (1) the right of assured and non-
discriminatory access to the deep seabed hard minerals 
resources;114 (2) security of tenure when their rights have accrued 
prior to the Treaty's entry into force with respect to the United 
States;115 (3) the privilege of continued exploration and recovery 
activities to the maximum extent practicable116 consistent with the 
Treaty; and (4) the protection of their interim investment.117 
Despite possible mystification due to the Delegation's 
fruitless but sincere pursuit of the yesable proposition, the final ar-
biters of policy and authoritative speakers for the United States 
hewed unswervingly to the interpretation of the common heritage 
of mankind which this country had when the long trail of 
negotiating began. Unhappily, however, the Delegation's 
chimerical pursuit of the Fisher Prescription appeared to en-
courage some Group of 77 representatives to entertain overly 
sanguine under-estimations of the United States' firm adhesion to 
its often repeated declarations. Thus the impossible quest tended 
to blur, while it never cancelled, the reality of this country's com-
mitment to her original position. The diplomacy which led to this 
114. 30 U.S.C. § 1441(1)(A). 
115. 30 U.S.C. § 1441(1)(B). 
116. 30 u.s.c. § 1442. 
117. 30 u.s.c. § 1443. 
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obfuscation can be contrasted with the approach which 
Talleyrand, that master of equivocation, credited the Duke of 
Wellington with and identified as the basis of the latter's great 
success at the Congress of Vienna: 
He [the Duke of Wellington] never indulged in that parade of 
mystification which is generally employed by Ambassadors: 
watchfulness, prudence and experience of human nature were 
the only means he employed; and it is not surprising that, by the 
use of these simple agencies, he acquired great influence.118 
118. GRONOW, THE REMINISCENCES AND RECOLLECTIONS OF CAPTAIN GRONOW 374 (Ray-
mond ed. 1964), quoted in 1 E. LONGFORD, WELLINGTON, THE YEARS OF THE SWORD 382 (1969). 
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APPENDIX 
Letter dated 24 November 1970 from the Chairman of the Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor 
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction addressed to the 
Chairman of the First Committee* 
QUESTION OF THE RESERVATION EX-
CLUSIVELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES OF 
THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR, AND 
THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, UNDERLYING THE 
HIGH SEAS BEYOND THE LIMITS OF PRE-
SENT NATIONAL JURISDICTION, AND THE 
USE OF THEIR RESOURCES IN THE IN-
TERESTS OF MANKIND: REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF 
THE SEA~ED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR 
BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL 
JURISDICTION. 
As you know, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-
Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National J urisdic-
tion was unable at its sessions in 1970 to report agreement on a 
declaration of principles for presentation to the General Assembly 
at its twenty-fifth session in accordance with operative paragraph 
4 of resolution 257 4 B (XXIV). After consulting and obtaining the 
concurrence of the Chairman of the Legal Sub-Committee, His Ex-
cellency Ambassador Galindo Pohl of El Salvador, and members of 
the Committee, I undertook informal consultations with members 
of the Committee in an effort to prepare a draft Declaration that 
would command general support. 
As a result of these consultations, a draft Declaration has 
emerged which, in my opinion, reflects the highest degree of 
agreement attainable at the present time. It does not, however, 
represent a consensus of all the members of the Committee. 
Having taken into consideration the views of the members of 
the Committee, I now have the honour to bring to your attention 
the text annexed hereto, which represents a compromise 
commanding wide support among the members of the Committee. 
* U.N. Doc. A/c.1/L. 542 (November 25, 1970) (issued in mimeographed form only). 
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Some delegations expressed their reservations as to the 
substance of the draft Declaration and the aforementioned pro-
cedure, and urged that, considering the lack of a consensus among 
members of the Committee on the draft Declaration, consultations 
be continued with a view to reaching wider agreement on the text. 
I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate this letter 
and the attached text as a document of the First Committee for 
the information of its members. 
(Signed) H.S. AMERASINGHE 
Chairman 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the 
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the 
Limits of National Jurisdiction 
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